Is the UK Ready to Put Boots on the Ground in Ukraine? Assessing Military Capacity and Challenges

Published: 21 August ‘2025. The English Chronicle Desk. The English Chronicle Online.

As discussions intensify over the potential deployment of British forces to Ukraine, questions are mounting about whether the United Kingdom is adequately prepared to provide sustained military support. Sir Keir Starmer has led a series of meetings with European allies to explore the creation of a “reassurance” force in Ukraine, aimed at bolstering the country’s defences against future Russian aggression. These deliberations follow a high-profile summit at the White House, described as “historic,” which brought together former US President Donald Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and eight European leaders in an attempt to negotiate a peace settlement with Russia.

Sir Keir has publicly affirmed that the UK is ready to put “boots on the ground and planes in the air” to support Ukraine, while taking the lead in forming a “coalition of the willing.” Trump, however, has ruled out sending American troops, leaving the UK and its allies to consider their commitments more closely. In this context, the Prime Minister has pledged to increase UK defence spending, asserting that “tyrants” such as Russian President Vladimir Putin “only respond to strength.” The government initially aimed to raise defence expenditure to 2.5 per cent of GDP by 2027, targeting 3 per cent by the end of the next term, a goal subsequently revised in line with NATO commitments to five per cent.

While relations with Russia have reached their lowest point since the Cold War, questions remain about the UK’s current military capabilities compared to historical levels. Ministry of Defence figures as of April 2024 indicate the army now operates 219 Challenger II main battle tanks, an increase from 213 the previous year, and 128 Ajax armoured fighting vehicles, although only 91 are currently in active service due to long-standing delays. The Royal Air Force has added four new F-35 fighter jets, bringing the total to 35, while Typhoon jets, submarines, destroyers, and frigates numbers have largely remained constant.

Despite modernisation, the UK’s armed forces are considerably smaller than in 1984, a reflection of peacetime conditions and technological evolution. Advanced systems in aircraft, submarines, and warships provide significantly higher quality and capability than Cold War-era equivalents, but losses in direct combat remain a pressing concern. Much of the army’s armoured equipment dates back decades, with some vehicles originating from the 1960s, while older Type-23 frigates in the navy were designed for a lifespan of 18–21 years and have surpassed 30 years of service. Equipment upgrades, when undertaken, temporarily reduce available numbers, raising questions about readiness for prolonged conflict.

Financial commitments have increased, with current defence spending at 2.3 per cent of GDP, set to rise to 2.5 per cent by 2027. Experts such as James Black of RAND caution that NATO’s two per cent guideline, formulated in a post-Cold War context, is insufficient for high-intensity operations against a capable adversary like Russia. Many military analysts argue that a long-term investment of three per cent or more of GDP is needed to rebuild stockpiles, acquire new technology, and maintain readiness. Sir Keir’s pledge to reach 2.5 per cent by 2027, and a potential 3.5 per cent by 2035, may address stockpile shortfalls but does not represent an immediate improvement in operational capability.

Personnel constraints further complicate the situation. Of roughly 180,000 personnel in the armed forces, only 127,000 are fully trained, with the remainder comprising reserves or untrained staff. Recruitment and retention challenges, exacerbated by reduced competitiveness in pay, demanding working conditions, and declining family support facilities, have resulted in a loss of experienced personnel to civilian jobs. Defence experts warn that expertise is as critical as equipment in modern warfare, particularly as systems become increasingly complex. Training new recruits to full operational capability takes several years, meaning any rapid deployment for peacekeeping or combat would face delays.

Lessons from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine underscore the need for sustained, long-term operational readiness. RAND analyst James Black notes that assumptions of short, high-intensity conflicts are misleading; prolonged war requires continuous resupply, replenishment of missiles and ammunition, and robust industrial support to maintain capabilities. The UK has contributed £7.8 billion in military aid to Ukraine since February 2022, including equipment directly drawn from national stockpiles, further straining available resources. Rebuilding these stockpiles could take four to five years, even with increased procurement, given the limited domestic industrial capacity for advanced defence equipment.

The current size of the armed forces, 45 per cent smaller than in 1984, combined with ageing equipment and supply chain constraints, raises pressing questions about the UK’s capacity to sustain boots-on-the-ground operations in Ukraine. Defence officials acknowledge these challenges, emphasising the need for a comprehensive Strategic Defence Review to address the gaps and prepare the nation’s forces for potential allied conflicts.

While political will and international commitments signal readiness to support Ukraine, analysts caution that actual operational effectiveness will depend on a combination of increased investment, modernisation of equipment, recruitment and retention of skilled personnel, and the ability to sustain prolonged military operations. The UK’s efforts to strengthen its armed forces, though significant, will require careful planning and long-term commitment to ensure that promises of “boots on the ground” translate into a practical, capable, and resilient military presence abroad.